Abstract. On-line monitoring is a useful technique for ensuring system reliability. By continuously supervising the system's operation, a wide range of problems, such as physical defects, transient faults and design errors, can be detected. A monitor M * 's behavior can be viewed as an abstraction of the target system M's behavior, and can be represented by a homomorphic mapping from M to M * . We present a systematic procedure to select homomorphisms for monitor design and measure their costs based on a behavioral fault model. Analysis of the method shows that monitors with very few states and low area can provide high fault coverage. Experimental results are presented which quantify the basic trade-off between area overhead and fault coverage. Simulation results under the industry-standard single stuck-at fault model are also reported.
Introduction
Increasingly, integrated circuits (ICs) are being used in safety-critical applications, from anti-lock braking in automobiles, to fly-by-wire aircraft, to prosthetic systems in the human body. At the same time, ICs are becoming more complex and compact, resulting in their increased susceptibility to transient or intermittent faults. Such faults affect the behavior of the circuits from time to time and must be detected quickly, suggesting a need for efficient on-line error monitoring. An on-line monitor continuously supervises the operation of a circuit and reports illegal behavior.
On-line monitoring strategies can be applied at various levels of abstraction, ranging from the gate and register-transfer levels to the system level. Run-time errors can be caught if we can check whether the current outputs are valid. In such approaches, the outputs of a circuit are usually encoded with an error-detecting code, and a monitor detects the occurrence of noncode outputs. A straightforward approach [18] is to append check bits to the normal output bits. The resulting designs consist of functional logic, a check-bit generator, and a checker. The functional logic generates the normal outputs, the check-bit generator generates the check bits, and the checker determines if the outputs are valid codewords. Various encoding methods, for instance, group parity codes [20] and Berger codes [14] , can be used to encode the outputs. A basic disadvantage of these methods is that a single fault inside the circuit may change the outputs to other codewords and so be undetectable.
We can also embed self-testing structures in the target design. Tests for functional modules can then be applied during the cycles when the modules are inactive. If the module functions are simple and the free cycles for each functional module can be pre-determined, we can schedule the test and normal operations at the same time without clearly defining a boundary between these two modes [8] . On the other hand, if the cycles during which a module is inactive are irregular, extra control signals may be needed to switch between the testing and normal modes [15] . The main disadvantage of this type of self-testing is that it is not good at detecting transient faults.
Signature analysis [12] is another widely studied approach to on-line monitoring of programmable systems. A co-processor, often called a watchdog or diagnostic processor, whose duties include signature computation and checking, is usually employed. Error detection by means of a watchdog is a two-phase process. In the first phase, signatures are computed and assigned to basic blocks of the target program, where a basic block is a set of instructions with no jumps allowed from or into these instructions. During the second phase, the monitor computes run-time signatures and compares them with the precomputed signatures received from the target system. Differences between these two sets of signatures reveal permanent or transient errors. Besides their limited ability to detect datarelated errors, such methods also cause performance degradation by increasing the number of instructions in a program.
In this paper, the system to be monitored M is modeled as a finite-state machine (FSM), for which a simple behavior fault model is defined. A monitor M * is then abstracted systematically from the behavioral description of M using homomorphisms selected under the guidance of appropriate cost measures. The effects of the number of states in the monitor on its area overhead and fault coverage are analyzed. It is shown that one-state monitors, i.e. combinational monitors, have small area overhead. Moreover, for FSMs with high output/state ratios, such monitors also have very high fault coverage under our behavioral fault model. Simulations under the standard single stuck-at fault model are also performed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After the introduction of some notation and our system model in the next section, we propose an algorithm for FSM behavior abstraction based on homomorphisms in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes how the area overhead and fault coverage of the monitors vary with respect to the number of states in the monitors. Experimental results are presented in Section 5, while some conclusions are discussed in Section 6.
System Model
A finite-state machine (FSM ) M is defined as a 6-tuple {I, S, δ, O, λ, S 0 }, where I is the set of inputs, S is the set of states, δ: I × S → 2 S is the state transition function, S is the set of outputs, λ:
is the output function, and S 0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states [11] . An FSM is deterministic if δ and λ are deterministic, that is, no input can map the machine to two or more outputs or next states at the same time. An FSM can be described using a state transition graph
where V M is the set of nodes, representing the state set of M and E M = { u, v , u, v ∈ V M } is the set of edges, representing the transition set of M. Each edge u, v is labeled with a set of input-output pairs, each of which denotes an input that triggers the state transition and the corresponding output. The number of edges that start from or end at a state u ∈ V M is called the degree of u. The maximum degree of all the states is called the degree of the STG. For convenience, the degree of the STG is also referred to as the degree of the corresponding FSM. Fig. 1(a) shows a state transition graph representing a seven-state FSM. The degrees of state A, D, and F are two, while that of B is four, which is the maximum degree of all these states. Therefore, the degree of the STG is four.
Let M = {I, S, δ, O, λ, S 0 } be the specification of an FSM, and M = {I, S, δ , O, λ , S 0 } be its implementation. M has a next-state fault on receiving input i in state s if δ(s, i) = δ (s, i), where s ∈ S and i ∈ I . Fig. 1(a) is shown in Fig. 2(a) . For brevity, only those transitions with output 0 are shown, while those with output 1 are omitted. Therefore, the indicated transitions correspond to all valid transitions in M.
We next perform behavior abstraction on the base monitor using homomorphisms, which provides the theoretical foundation for our approach. A many-to- 
shows a homomorphic image of the FSM M * 0 in Fig. 2(a) . This particular homomorphism maps states A and B of M * 0 into one state in its image, while all other states, inputs and outputs are mapped to themselves. Intuitively, a homomorphism reduces the number of states and preserves the mappings of the next-state and output functions; hence it is a precise form of behavior abstraction.
The overall monitoring scheme is illustrated in Fig. 3(a) . The monitor M * operates in lockstep with M, it can mimic the state transitions of M and report SBFs with just a one-cycle delay. If the monitor is the base monitor M * 0 , all possible SBFs can be detected. If lower fault coverage is allowed, we can perform homomorphisms on M * 0 to obtain a smaller, and therefore more economical, monitor M * . As shown in Fig. 3 (b), M * is composed of two parts: interface logic which implements the homomorphisms from M to M * , and a compact FSM M c which approximates the state transitions of M.
Abstraction Algorithm
To reduce the monitor area, we apply homomorphisms to M * 0 in two stages called the state and input stages. In the state homomorphism stage, we gradually reduce the number of states in the monitor. The fault coverage hence decreases due to the limited knowledge available concerning target system states. While in the input homomorphism stage, we only perform a simple transformation, which does not hurt the fault coverage. We do not consider output homomorphisms, since the base monitor has only a single output. Note that the inputs of M * 0 incorporate both the inputs and outputs of the original machine M.
The state homomorphism stage involves constructing a series of homomorphisms of the form:
. Such mappings are referred to as simple state homomorphisms. While H reduces the number of states in the monitors, the number of detectable SBFs also decreases because of the state merging. Homomorphisms that lead to as few undetectable SBFs as possible are desirable, because our goal is to obtain monitors with small area, capable of detecting as many SBFs as possible. Furthermore, the number of available simple state homomorphisms is proportional to the square of the number of states in the monitor. Therefore, to guide the selection of simple state homomorphisms, we define a homomorphism cost function C(H ) that measures the homomorphism's impact on fault coverage.
For a homomorphism H :
is the number of SBFs that become undetectable if we replace as the monitor. For example, the transition from E to A on receiving input 01 or 10 is detectable in M * 0 . This fault is, however, undetectable using M * 1 . The transition from G to B on input 11 also belongs to this type. The associated cost C 1 (H ) is defined as:
The constant coefficients 2 and 1 are the cardinalities of tr input(E, B) = {01, 10} and tr input(G, A) = {11}. In general, if states s 1 and s 2 are to be merged and some inputs trigger the transition from a state s to s 1 or s 2 , each input corresponds to a next-statechange fault that will escape detection by the image monitor. The general formula to compute the cost C 1 (H ) is given in the first row of Fig. 4 .
• 
The general formula for C 2 (H ) is shown in the second row of Fig. 4 . We can read the formula as follows. If states s 1 and s 2 are to be merged and some inputs triggers the transition from s 1 or s 2 to a state s, each of the inputs introduces to a current-state-change fault that will escape detection by the image monitor.
In general, suppose that states s 1 and s 2 are to be merged into a single state s, and input i causes a transition from s 1 to s 2 , the faulty transition from s 2 to s 1 on input i corresponds to a current-next-stateexchange fault that cannot be detected by the image monitor. The general formula of C 3 (H ) is shown in the third row of Fig. 4 . The total cost C(H ) of a simple state homomorphism H that maps state s 1 and s 2 into one image is the sum C 1 (H ) + C 2 (H ) + C 3 (H ) of the costs specified above. The formulas in Fig. 4 indicate the complexity of computing C(H ). Given a state pair, the only computation is a group of set differences, whose complexity is O(d), where d is the degree of the monitoring FSM. There are in total |S| 2 state pairs, resulting in a final complexity of O(d|S| 2 ). We turn next to the selection of the homomorphisms used to construct M * . In general, a homomorphism H can introduce non-determinism. For example, M * 1 in Fig. 2(b) is non-deterministic because applying input 00 to state AB triggers transitions to itself and to C. Such non-determinism is easily eliminated, but it increases the number of states. Thus we want to select homomorphisms that have both low cost C and deterministic images. To aid this heuristic selection process, we introduce the state dependency graph. A state dependency graph
= s, and other states, inputs and outputs are mapped to themselves. There is an edge (n i , n j ) from n i to n j in G if there is an input t such that λ(s i,1 , t) = s j,1 and λ(s i,2 , t) = s j,2 , or else λ(s i,1 , t) = s j,2 and λ(s i,2 , t) = s j,1 . Intuitively, the edge (n i , n j ) indicates that if we apply homomorphism i , we must also apply homomorphism j to eliminate non-determinism due to i . In the FSM in Fig. 2(a) , the next states of states A and B on input 00 are B and C, respectively. Therefore, there is an edge from node (A, B) to (B, C), as shown in Fig. 5 2 ) since we have to make the comparison for every state pair. The SDG is similar to the implication graph used for FSM minimization [10] . The major difference is that in an SDG, we only consider whether two states have the same next states on all inputs, while in an Fig. 2(a) . implication graph, we take both next states and outputs into consideration. A strongly connected component (SCC) in a directed graph is a set of nodes in which there are paths between any two nodes. The dotted lines in Fig. 5 indicate some SCCs in the SDG. SCCs that do not depend on other SCCs represent sets of mappings that should be applied together to avoid non-deterministic images. The homomorphism cost of an SCC is the sum of the costs of the simple state homomorphisms represented by the nodes in the SCC. We apply homomorphisms represented by nodes in SCCs with the lowest cost during the abstraction process until no further homomorphisms can be applied without violating fault coverage constraints. The algorithm is shown in Fig. 6 . The complexity of the algorithm is dominated by SDG construction, which occurs in every iteration. Since each iteration reduces the number of states by at least one, the maximum number of iterations is |S|. Therefore, the worst case complexity of the overall algorithm is O(d 2 |S| 3 ). After the state homomorphism stage, homomorphisms that map the inputs to a smaller input space can be applied. Fig. 7 shows a monitor M * obtained after the state homomorphism stage on base monitor M * 0 in Fig. 3 has been completed. Note that this monitor's behavior is incompletely specified. For instance, the transitions of state st2 on inputs 00 and 01 are not defined. The reason for this is that valid inputs of the target machine M are usually only a non-trivial subset of the whole input space. We can think of this as saying there is a dummy state serving as the next state of the unspecified transitions, and the output of those transitions is 1, indicating an error in M. The input space is naturally partitioned into two groups by the state transitions initiated from state st1 by inputs 00, 10 and inputs 11, 01. Similarly, state st2 also divides the input space into two groups based on its transitions. The inputs that can be mapped to the same image are those always in the same group for all partitions. For example, inputs 01 and 11 of M * are in the same group because they always trigger transitions with the same next states and outputs for all current states. On the other hand, inputs 00 and 01 cannot be mapped to the same image input because they result in the same next state when the current state is st0, but result in different next states when the current state is st1. Therefore, instead of considering inputs pair by pair, we form a cross product of all the partitions made by the states. All inputs in the same partition of the cross products can then be mapped to the same image.
In the above algorithm, state abstraction starts directly from the base monitor. One can ask whether it is beneficial to extend the two-stage approach (state homomorphism selection followed by input homomorphism selection) to a three-stage one, where we first apply some input homomorphisms. That is, we divide the signals of O into groups, compute an even (or odd) parity check bit for each group, and form O with these parity check bits. Thus, if 1101 is an output of M, and is viewed as two groups 11 and 01, then parity bits for these two groups are 0 and 1, respectively. Hence 01 is a parity code for output 1101. This process is analogous to first generating an FSM whose outputs are the group parity check bits of M's outputs, and then constructing a base monitor M 0 for the new FSM. The previous two-stage approach can then be applied to M 0 . Note that if we construct O by generating one even parity check bit for each bit of M's outputs, we obtain M 0 = M * 0 . Therefore, the twostage approach can be viewed as a special case of the three-stage one, where an identity input homomorphism is applied. The area of M 0 is almost certainly smaller than that of M * 0 if the input homomorphism is nontrivial, because it has fewer input signals. Starting with a smaller monitor for state abstraction, we may obtain a smaller final monitor that meets some bounds on fault coverage. However, the number of available homomorphisms with deterministic images may also decrease, leaving the potential benefits of this technique an open question. Our experiments will show that it is possible to obtain monitors with high fault coverage and low area overhead following this approach.
Area/Fault Coverage Trade-Offs
The monitor design approaches proposed above trades off fault coverage for area overhead. The area reduction primarily results from the reduction of the number of states in the monitor. We now investigate how the number of states in monitor M * affects its area overhead and fault coverage. In Section 5, we will verify this analysis experimentally.
As shown in Fig. 3(b) , M * consists of the interface logic IL and the compressed finite-state machine M c . Let n and l be the number of input and output bits of IL, respectively, and S the number of states in M c . We use L = 2 l to denote the number of outputs. As discussed in Section 3, the transitions initiated from one state divide the input space into disjoint sets. Since a state may change to any other state, the state transitions initiated from a state divide the input space into (S + 1)/2 sets. The final partition of the input space has L = ((S + 1)/2) S sets in the worst case. In fact, the compressed finite-state machine M c typically has only a few states and inputs. Therefore, the interface logic takes the major portion of the monitor area.
Let F be an arbitrary multiple-output Boolean function representing the interface logic, and having n input bits and l output bits. The area of IL is approximated by the number of literals in the following equations [5] .
Here,x i is a literal representing an input variable or its complement. p i is prime implicant of the multipleoutput function F and
The probability thatx i1xi2 . . .
n−k , where a k-cube is assigned a fixed value while all its n − k neighboring k-cubes are not. There are altogether ( n k )2 n−k possible k-cubes and L possible assignments to a k-cube. Consequently, the average number of k-cube prime implicants in F is
The above expression contains L − 1 rather than L so that the prime implicants with a i = 0 can be removed. Therefore, the average number of prime implicants in
Since a k-cube has n − k literals, the average number of literals in Eqs. (2), (3), . . . , (t + 1) is
In Eq. (1), p i occurs multiple times if the number of 1's in a i is more than one. Since the expected number of 1's in a i is l/2, the expected total number of literals for F is
The value of K (n, L) for several nL combinations is plotted in Fig. 8 . This figure shows that the expected number of literals K (n, L) increases significantly with the number of outputs L. Furthermore, the number of the outputs increase exponentially with the number of states in M c . Therefore, the expected number of literals, or equivalently, the monitor area decreases significantly as the number of states in M c decreases.
We now consider the monitor's fault coverage. Usually, the behavior of a system is not completely specified, leaving more optimization opportunities in the design process. The don't cares in the specification of the target FSM M affect the complexity of both M and its monitor. Therefore, it may be beneficial if we consider the overall area of M and its monitor when the don't cares are exploited. This "design-for-monitoring" problem is beyond the scope of the present paper, however. Since our monitors are designed to detect faults in the final FSMs whose don't cares have been eliminated during the design process, we focus on completely specified FSMs. For a completely specified FSM with u input bits, V states and w output bits, the total number of single next-state faults is 2 u × V × (V − 1) since under the SBF model, any incorrect next state for a given current state and input is a fault. Similarly, the number of single output faults is 2 u × V × (2 w − 1). Therefore, the total number of SBFs is 2 u × V × (2 w + V − 2). When the monitor has a single state, we cannot distinguish the faulty next state from the correct one. In addition, if an input triggers different outputs for different current states, we cannot identify a faulty output if the output is valid for some current states. Therefore, the total number of undetectable faults is 2 u ×V ×(2V −2) given that 2 w ≥ V in the worst case. Consequently, the fault coverage is
If a target FSM has high output/state ratio 2 w /V , which means that V /2 w is approximately 0, we can usually obtain single-state monitors with high fault coverage. For example, the MCNC benchmark circuit S1484 in Fig. 9 has 48 states and 19 output bits. On the other hand, single-state monitors typically take much less area than their multiple-state counterparts. Therefore, for FSMs with high output/state ratios, we can often reduce the area significantly by reducing the number of monitor states to one with only minor fault coverage loss.
Experimental Results
A set of experiments was performed on the MCNC FSM benchmark circuits [2] to evaluate our monitor design method and the foregoing analysis. Fig. 9 shows the results on several representative benchmarks. The FSMs to be monitored and their properties (number of input bits, number of output bits, number of states and area) are shown in columns 2 to 5, followed by the area overhead of simple duplication. The next four columns present the number of output check bits, inputs, states, and area of the corresponding monitors, respectively. The area overhead and fault coverage are shown in the last two columns, which are our main metrics of monitor effectiveness. In the duplication case, we assume that the outputs from the two copies of the target FSMs are compared with dual-rail checker trees [19] . The FSMs to be monitored, their monitors, and the dualrail checkers were all synthesized using the Synopsys synthesis tools [17] , which also reported the areas of the FSMs and their monitors. Area is shown in Fig. 9 as a multiple of the area of a standard two-input NAND.
The results demonstrate that monitors with a few states and high fault coverage can be obtained. For example, the first monitor for ex1 takes 63% of the area of ex1, while its fault coverage is above 96%. However, the monitors with only one state, i.e., combinational monitoring circuits, almost always lead to monitors with smaller area overhead. For example, when the number of states of the monitors for ex1, ex6 and tma increases from 1 to 2, the area overheads are almost tripled. This trend holds for all other examples, too. On the other hand, the fault coverage of the onestate monitors for ex1 and s1488 is still around 99%. Even for ex6 and tma, their one-state monitors have fault coverage around 90%. However, the fault coverage of circuit tbk's combinational monitor is as low as 15.6%. As analyzed in Section 4, the fault coverage of the combinational monitors depends on the output/state ratios of the target machines. The ratios for all circuits except tbk are high, leading to one-state monitors with high fault coverage, which confirms our earlier analysis. The results also show that the overhead of most of the online monitors is smaller than that of duplication. In particular, the overhead of the combinational monitors is much smaller than simple duplication.
We also applied our method on some larger ITC'99 benchmark circuits [7] to investigate the scalability of the proposed approach. We examined the benchmarks from b01 to b10, among which b01, b02, and b06 are excluded because they have fewer than 10 registers. Since these circuits are given in blif format, we extracted their FSM representations using the "stg extract -e -c" routine of SIS [16] . Circuits b08 and b09 have tens of thousands of states, and require too much memory for our current implementation. SIS also failed to generate an FSM for b04 because of its huge number of states. For the remaining circuits, we ran our program on a SUN Blade-1000 with 512 MB of RAM and the run times needed to obtain the combinational monitors are reported in Fig. 10 . We can see that the run times for FSMs with tens of states are less than a second. Even for FSMs with more than 2,000 states, the run times are less than two hours. These data give us confidence that processing even larger FSMs like b08 or b09 is feasible given a more memory-efficient implementation of our method.
In order to investigate the monitors's fault detection capability under the standard single stuck-at fault (SAF) model, we did another set of experiments. Since the monitor has only one output signal, we can detect an SAF inside the monitor if it forces the output to 1; otherwise, the monitor will not report the error. This problem can easily be solved by using dual-rail logic, for instance, differential cascode voltage switch (DCVS) [6] logic. DVCS has an inherent self-testing property which can provide good coverage for stuck-at faults [13] . Although it is also claimed to have advantages over traditional static CMOS in terms of layout area, its application is limited to small modules due to transistor sizing and crossbar current problems. Therefore, it is more appropriate to use it in the monitor rather than the whole circuit. In our experiments, we only inject SAFs into the target system and keep the monitor fault-free. Because the monitors are designed to detect transient faults, we assume that a fault will disappear after a certain time. Since the duration of a transient fault is usually only a fraction of a cycle [1] , we limit the fault duration to one cycle.
In this set of experiments, we studied the fault coverage of the monitors as a function of the fault detection latency. Intuitively, we regard those SAFs that actually lead to wrong outputs or might lead to wrong outputs later as detectable faults. Therefore, we treat an SAF as detectable if it satisfies one of the following conditions: 
(c) Fig. 11 . SAF fault coverage as a function of fault detection latency for the monitors of (a) ex1 (b) ex6 and mc, and (c) tbk, tma, and s1488.
(1) it produces a wrong output within a fixed time after the fault occurrence, which is set to 32 cycles, or (2) it leads to a wrong state in the 32nd cycle but does not cause a wrong output. We enumerated all the SAFs in the circuits and injected every fault 100 times. After a fault is injected into the circuit, we randomly applied input patterns until the fault was detected, or the circuit started to generate both correct outputs and correct next states, or 32 cycles elapsed. We collected the number of faults detected by the monitor at a given latency ranging from one to 32 cycles and divided it by the total number of detectable faults; this is defined as the fault coverage of the monitor under the given latency assumptions. The SAF fault coverage as a function of the fault detection latency for all the monitors is plotted in Fig. 11 . This figure shows that the monitors detect most of the faults in the first cycle after fault injection, and far fewer in the following cycles. Furthermore, the fault coverage increases gradually in the first eight cycles and flattens thereafter for almost all the monitors. Taking the monitor mc-5out1state 1 in Fig. 11(b) , for example, we can see that 55% of the SAFs are detected at the first cycle, and another 10% are detected in the following seven cycles. Only a few percent of the SAFs are detected after the eighth cycle. The fault coverage here shows trends similar to the fault coverage under the SBF model. Nevertheless, the fault coverage of SAFs varies more than that of SBFs. The fault coverage of the combinational monitors after eight cycles is 60 to 80%. In fact, detectable SAFs form only a small part (10 to 35%) of all injected SAFs.
Conclusion
We have presented a systematic method to design online monitors for finite-state machines. We first define the single behavior fault (SBF) model and construct a base monitor that detects all SBFs. A heuristic method based on homomorphisms is then systematically applied to reduce the monitor area. The state dependency graph is introduced to guide homomorphism selection. We analyzed the effects of the number of states on the monitor's area overhead and fault coverage. Our results show that monitors with a few states often have both low area overhead and high fault coverage. In FSMs with high output/state ratios, a decrease in the number of monitor states can significantly reduce the area overhead, while incurring marginal fault coverage loss. In fact, it is often beneficial to compress the number of states in the monitor to one for these FSMs. Our experimental results are consistent with the analysis. Simulations under the standard single stuck-at fault (SAF) model show similar trends. Furthermore, the simulations also show that most transient faults are detected quickly-usually within a few clock cycles.
